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Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry commanded Task Force 
Orion, the first Canadian battlegroup 
to operate from Kandahar, for the first 
seven months of 2006 in Afghanistan. 
Colonel Hope, who spent time in the 
British Army, is writing a book on his 
experiences, and he has published at 
least one article in which he offers 
some interesting judgments.1 Take this 
one, as he writes about the American 
soldiers of Devil Company of the 2nd 
Battalion, Fourth Infantry Regiment, 
who were under his command: “I was 
proud of these Devil soldiers. Later, 
as I reflected upon this, I realized 
that, at some point in the past decade, 
we have had a fundamental shift in 
the culture of the Canadian infantry, 
making us identify most readily 
with the American, and not British, 
soldiers.” D Company, he says, was 
“easy to work with, reliable, and very 
professional. Perhaps the biggest 
similarity was that they wanted to 
fight, unlike the soldiers of other 
countries who remained very risk-
averse….”
 It is unusual for a Canadian 
officer to heap public praise on 
the US Army whose leaders, Hope 
says, “demonstrated decisiveness 
and tenacity, and [whose] soldiers 
performed battle drills quickly and 
with great effect.” Hope speaks for 
himself alone, but I believe him to 
be correct.
 I begin with his quote for two 
reasons. The first is to tell you where 
the Canadian army – and also the 
air force and navy – are today in 
their relationship with the US and 
UK. The second is to suggest that 
Colonel Hope is also right when 
he notes that the army’s very close 
relationship with the British military 
had lasted well into the 1990s. The 
Royal Canadian Air Force had flown 
south by the mid-1950s and the Royal 
Canadian Navy had certainly sailed 
the same way by 1962. Why did the 
army stay loyal to its traditions for 
so long? What drove the military 
relationship apart for the other 
services?
 Canada and Great  Bri ta in 
emerged from World War II as the 
closest of friends and allies. At least 
a half-million Canadians served in 
Britain during the war, and Canadian 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen fought 
under overall British command in 
Northwest Europe, Italy, and Asia. 
The Canadian government also gave 
billions of dollars in gifts and Mutual 
Aid to Britain with the overwhelming 
support of the Canadian people.
 But the war changed everything. 
Britain’s defeat on the Continent in 
May and June 1940 forced Canada 
to turn south for protection, the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence 
(PJBD), created in August 1940, being 
the first North American defence 
alliance. It was followed by the Hyde 
Park Agreement in 1941, in effect 
the first economic alliance. Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill scorned 
what he saw as Canada’s scurrying 
for cover under the US umbrella, 
but though he saw the future, he was 
wrong in 1940. Without the guarantee 
of homeland security provided by the 
US alliance, Canada could not have 
sent the huge forces to Britain that 
it did between 1940 and 1945. On 
the other hand, Canada prepared a 
division for service in the invasion of 
Japan, one that was to be organized 
on American lines and equipped with 
US weapons. Why? As General A.G.L. 
McNaughton, the Defence Minister in 
1945 and always a cautious man in 
dealing with the Yanks, said, “One 
of the primary reasons…was to 
obtain experience with the United 
States system of Army organization 
and U.S. equipment in view of the 
obvious necessity for the future to 
co-ordinate the defence of North 
America…“2 The future was drawing 
near and it was American.
From Mother Country
to Far Away Relative
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AbstrAct: Historically, Canada has looked 
to Great Britain for its military culture. 
During the First and Second World 
Wars, the Canadian army was virtually 
interchangeable with the British army. 
However, the decline of British military 
power starting in 1940 increasing caused 
Canada to gravitate towards her neighbour 
to the south.
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 These strategic military (and 
economic) changes turned out to be 
permanent, as Churchill foresaw, 
just as the commitment to the PJBD 
was renewed in 1947. The Soviet 
threat kept Canada and the United 
States working closely together 
on continental defence, and the 
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 
in 1949 and the despatch of troops 
and an air division to Europe in 
1951, cemented Canada’s reliance 
on its neighbour. Yes, the Canadian 
NATO brigade, just as the Korean 
brigade, served with British troops, 
but very significantly, the soldiers 
in Korea refused to eat British or 
Australian rations and insisted on 
American. Brigadier J.M. Rockingham 
“explained that my cooks had been 
trained to cook American rations and 
my soldiers had become used to them 
and liked them very much.”3 The 
RCN, operating three destroyers in 
Korean waters, found much the same 
thing. “The Commonwealth base at 
Kure [Japan]…had the right kinds of 
ammunition and machinery spares 
for the Canadian ships,” Commander 
Tony German wrote, “but…British 
provisions were terrible. Canadian 
ration scales were much better than 
RN now, but in Kure they mainly got 
tough mutton….From the Americans 
in Sasebo there was first-rate beef…. 
ice cream, milk, fresh fruit and 
vegetables and such magic as frozen 
French fries….”4 Armies (and navies 
too) march on their stomachs and, 
whenever they could be secured, the 
Canadians now simply refused to 
march with British rations. That was 
a harbinger of the coming changes.
 American equipment too was 
increasingly coveted. Sometimes 
this was because US equipment was 
both more comfortable to wear, better 
designed for protection, and simply 
more effective than the Second World 
War-pattern British material used by 
the Canadian forces. For example, 
the steel helmet used by British and 
Canadian forces offered no cover 
for the back of the neck, weighed 
a ton, and was so awkward that it 
was almost impossible to run while 
wearing it. “The less said about the 
present helmet the better,” wrote 
one infantry battalion commander. 
The American helmet, by contrast, 
offered better protection and, because 
it had a liner that was removable, 
could even be used for cooking over 
an open fire in a pinch. No Canadian 
wept when the UK helmet was 
scrapped in the late-1950s. Even the 
American mess tins, eating utensils 
and cup were better designed than 
the comparable Canadian equipment 
issued to soldiers in the field.5 In 
advanced weaponry, this American 
superiority was even more marked 
and, as the Avro Arrow cancellation 
in 1959 demonstrated, Canadian 
industry now was priced out of the 
market for big ticket items. So too 
were the British, as the cancellation 
of the Blue Streak missile in 1960 
also showed. Nonetheless, Canada 
bought British Centurion tanks in the 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, commander 
of Task Force Orion in Afghanistan, arrives 
at Kandahar airfield aboard a Canadian 
Hercules aircraft in 2006. Hope worked 
closely with American forces while in 
Afghanistan and viewed the experience 
as positive.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King and 
President Franklin Roosevelt, shown here 
with US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 
signed an historic defence agreement at 
Ogdensburg, NY on 18 August 1940 which 
established the Permanent Joint Board 
on Defence. This agreement streamlined 
defence planning between Canada and 
the US.
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1950s and used them for more than 
two decades.
 Still there were big differences 
between the Canadian and US 
armies. The army commitment to 
northern Germany under the British 
Army of the Rhine had been pushed 
through by the anglophile Chief of 
the General Staff, Lieutenant-General 
Guy Simonds, one of the few victories 
he won over the US-leaning Chairman 
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
General Charles Foulkes. Simonds 
had complained in 1947 that the 
American “military authorities made 
plans based entirely on potential 
enemy capabilities, whereas it was 
the practice in Canada to take into 
consideration not only capabilities 
but probabilities.”6 Simonds tried 
to maintain the filial links with the 
British forces and even created a 
Regular Force regiment of Canadian 
Guards when he was Chief of the 
General Staff. The Anglo-Canadian 
alliance was implicit and informal; 
Simonds wanted it to be more, but the 
fact that the RCAF in NATO served 
under the US and that the RCN 
served under SACLANT, run out of 
Norfolk, Virginia, were in retrospect 
far more significant.
 The next key event, of course, 
was the Suez Crisis of the autumn 
of 1956. The Eden government had 
not taken Canada into its confidence 
as it planned its strike at President 
Nasser’s Egypt, and the sense of 
shock in Canada and in the St. 
Laurent government was pronounced 
when British and French aircraft 
attacked Egypt, followed belatedly 
by soldiers. Whatever the rights or 
wrongs of the case, London and Paris’ 
timing was execrable, the attacks 
coming in the days just before a US 
presidential election and during 
the time when the USSR’s iron heel 
was being applied to Hungary. 
Ottawa’s instinctive response was 
to try to save Britain from its folly, 
and Lester Pearson tried to turn the 
Anglo-French invaders into a United 
Nations peacekeeping force. It took 
only a few moments for that to be a 
non-starter, and Pearson then called 
for the creation of the first large UN 
force. That idea worked, gave Britain 
and France a way out of Egypt, and 
won Pearson a Nobel Peace Prize.
 The military significance of 
Suez for Canada was real. Pearson 
offered Canadian troops for the UN 
Emergency Force, a battalion of the 
Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada. The 
Egyptians protested – how could 
their citizens distinguish between the 
British invaders and the Canadian 
peacekeepers? The name of the unit 
reeked of Empire, the uniforms were 
very similar, and the flag carried by 
the Canadian soldiers had the Union 
Jack in the corner. There was much 
logic in this complaint, and it took a 
major diplomatic effort to persuade 
Nasser to let Canadian logistics 
troops into UNEF. 
During the Korean War, Canadian troops fought under British command in the Commonwealth
Division, but the soldiers and sailors had more in common with their American neighbours.
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 Pearson learned from this 
experience. First, the government in 
which he served lost the 1957 general 
election to John Diefenbaker who 
espoused loyalty to the Empire, one 
sign that much of the Canadian public 
still looked to London for its lead. 
Diefenbaker’s loyalism was severely 
shaken by British efforts to join Europe 
and to abandon the Commonwealth 
trade relationship, and by the time he 
left office, Britain scarcely mattered 
economically to Canada. Second, and 
more important militarily, when 
Pearson came back to power in 
1963, this time as Prime Minister, 
he moved to give Canada its own 
distinctive flag, and his government 
pushed through the unification of 
the Canadian Forces 
with a distinctive 
uniform worn by 
all three services. 
The lessons  of 
S u e z  i n d e e d .  A n 
unintended effect was that 
Pearson’s Nobel Prize made 
the Canadian public believe 
that peacekeeping was their 
métier, and over time this attitude 
let governments cut defence budgets 
because peacekeepers did not need 
much beyond blue berets. The attitude 
also affected the soldiers who came 
to think that they were not meant to 
fight.
 The air  force had already 
changed imperial masters. The Royal 
Canadian Air Force and the United 
States Air Force had developed 
An RCAF Boeing XF-99 Bomarc  missile 
on launch erector in North Bay, Ontario, 
in 1965. The Bomarc surface-to-air 
missile was an American weapons system 
purchased by Canada to defend against 
attack by Soviet bombers.
This Canadian soldier, preparing to take 
part in the joint US-Canadian attack 
on Kiska  (August 1943) is kitted 
out with a mix of Canadian and 
American gear. His weapon (a 
Lee-Enfield rifle), battledress, 
and ammunition pouches are 
of standard British-Canadian 
issue, while his helmet, pack, 
rifle belt and canteen has been 
drawn from US stores.
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a close relationship after World 
War II. The Canadians wanted US 
fighters, and they secured the F-86 
Sabre. They recognized that they 
had to cooperate with the USAF in 
defending the continent, and both 
air forces pushed their governments 
into the North American Air Defence 
agreement in 1957-58, a pact that 
treated air defence as a shared 
task. Historian Joseph Jockel noted 
that the “two air forces had every 
reason to cooperate. They were faced 
with a common military threat. As 
airmen, they shared an outlook which 
created a similar identity and even an 
emotional bond. They were interested 
in convincing civilians of the danger 
to the continent. Both were locked in 
struggles with their sister services for 
defence funds. Finally, for the RCAF, 
the USAF was a source of funding 
for radar stations and a source of 
pressure on Ottawa to recognize 
the importance of air defence.”7 
And soon the RCAF wanted nuclear 
weapons to make its air defence 
task easier and aircraft like the the 
CF-104 Starfighter and the CP-140 
Aurora under schemes that often saw 
parts built in Canada or offsets for 
Canadian industry included in the 
deal. American equipment was not 
always the very best available, but it 
was invariably close to it. 
 Moreover, in contrast to the 
increasingly impecunious Canadian 
and British armed services, the 
United States military had the 
goods of modern warfare in lavish 
profusion, and the officers and men 
of the Canadian Forces inevitably 
and understandably wanted their 
small share of it. In effect, this 
equipment envy was often a driving 
force for policy. The RCAF desire 
for Bomarc surface-to-air missiles 
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in fact destroyed the Diefenbaker 
government with just a little push 
from the Kennedy administration in 
early 1963.
 The navy similarly had turned 
south. There had been mutinies 
on RCN ships in early 1949, and 
one cause was said to be slavish 
imitation of Royal Navy style. 
Canadianization was urged on the 
sailors, but Americanization was 
to follow. As one commentator 
noted, “The coming change was first 
detected in the new terminology”– the 
British term “asdic” was superseded 
by the American word “sonar.“8 
The establishment of NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Command Atlantic 
(SACLANT), with headquarters at 
Norfolk, VA, also meant that the 
RCN now had its place with the 
USN and not the Royal Navy. The 
RCN worked itself into being a first-
rate anti-submarine fleet, and the 
ties forged with the United States 
Navy were strong, so much so that 
in the fall of 1962 during the Cuban 
missile crisis, the RCN in Halifax 
put to sea on its commander’s orders 
despite the refusal of the Diefenbaker 
government to order a full-scale 
alert. Rear-Admiral Kenneth Dyer’s 
relationship with his US commanders 
at SACLANT had been formed 
over the years in countless NATO 
exercises and was so close and so 
trusting, his assessment of the Soviet 
threat so fearful, that he felt obliged 
to put to sea to assist his ally. “That 
‘band of brothers,’ Nelson’s basic 
way of running things at sea, by 
mutual understanding and a firm 
grasp of the basic aim,” Commander 
Tony German wrote, “was alive and 
well in North America in 1962. The 
navy…honoured Canada’s duty to 
stand by her North American ally.”9 
Even if the Prime Minister had 
wished otherwise. The air force did 
much the same at its air defence bases 
in Canada, responding to NORAD, 
not to Ottawa.
 Only the army seemed untouched 
by the southwards attraction. 
Canadian soldiers tended to sneer 
at the Americans as too wasteful 
of lives and equipment, too soft, 
too American. Brooke Claxton, a 
Canadian Corps veteran of the Great 
War and the Minister of National 
Defence under St. Laurent, visited 
Korea and returned unimpressed 
with the American commanders 
and appalled by the “lying” of staff 
officers who gave the briefings. 
He wrote a friend that “American 
expenditures of lives and ammunition 
are high according to our standards, 
higher than our people would be 
willing to accept.”10 The British model 
of mustachioed officers with their 
swagger sticks was the better one, 
or so soldiers appeared to think. The 
regimental names, the links to British 
units, the royals as colonels-in-chief, 
even uniforms made by British 
military tailors (on credit) – all such 
things kept the ties alive for a long 
time as the world changed. 
 Unif icat ion in 1968 was a 
major blow to the traditions and 
links, dealing a killing blow to the 
Army’s system of corps and its 
distinctive and much loved uniforms, 
buttons, and badges. The dark green 
uniform that came with unification 
homogenized the Canadian military 
and especially weakened the land 
forces’ psychological defences against 
Americanization. It was, one officer 
unhappily said, “an attempt to cleanse 
the forces of their Britishness,” a trait 
“contrary to the cause of Canadian 
unity.”11 The 1970 stand down of 
regiments like the Black Watch, the 
Queen’s Own, and the Guards also 
sapped army morale – and further 
diluted Britishness.
 But for another three decades 
the Canadian army still resisted 
the southward pull. It was still 
“leftenant” and “kharki”,  not 
“lootenant” and “khaki.” The ties, 
After the Second World War, the Royal 
Canadian Air Force developed a close 
relationship with the US Air Force. Part of 
that relationship entailed buying American 
aircraft. Here Squadron Leader Andy 
MacKenzie stands beside a US-developed 
fighter – the F-86 Sabre.
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like the pronunciation, I think, 
disappeared under the strain of the 
1990s. The Canadian army had been 
reduced to some 25,000 all ranks 
by successive cuts, and as the Cold 
War ended, it was so weak that it 
could not despatch a fully equipped 
battalion, let alone a brigade, to 
participate in the first Gulf War. 
Then came Somalia and revelations 
of torture and murder by members 
of the Canadian Airborne Regiment 
and failures in command by senior 
officers. Simultaneously there was 
the operation in Former Yugoslavia 
where at least one unit performed 
very well in action against Croatian 
regulars, but others, handicapped by 
post-Somalia rules of engagement, 
found themselves referring to the 
Judge Advocate General’s branch for 
permission to smoke, let alone fight. 
The Canadian units were abbreviated 
as Canbat I and II, for Canadian 
battlegroups I and II. They were 
known to British troops in theatre as 
the “Can’t bats,” and it was largely 
true.
 The dismal 1990s turned the 
Canadian Forces and especially the 
army inwards, and it determined 
that it was ill-educated, ill-prepared, 
ill-trained and, most obviously, ill-
equipped. The events of September 
11, 2001 made clear that this was no 
longer adequate, and the Paul Martin 
and Stephen Harper governments 
began re-arming the military. The 
psychological change had already 
occurred, and I would suggest that 
looking south for the model and 
finding it in the U.S. Army that had 
regenerated and re-educated itself 
after the disasters of Vietnam was 
both appropriate and necessary. The 
names of Canada’s historic regiments 
remain, redolent of Empire, but little 
else of that British past is still there. 
We are friends and allies forever, 
but the Canadian military now look 
fondly to Britain as a relative living 
far away. Mama, sometimes feared 
and occasionally admired, is now 
right next door.
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The Canadian and US militaries continue 
to work closely together.
Left: Canadian and American soldiers 
patrol together in the Panjwaii District 
west of Kandahar City during Operation 
Medusa, September 2006. 
Below left: Two Canadian ships restock 
their fuel supplies from the American 
tanker Patoxtent, 8 September 2005. (L-R) 
HMCS Toronto, USS Patuxtent, and HMCS 
Athabaskan. The Canadian ships and their 
crews were part of OP UNISON a mission to 
deliver aid after hurricane Katrina.
Photo by MCpl John Clevett,CFJIC HS2005-F0003-07 
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